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| | LOS ANGELES COUNTY | |
| 1 | EMPLOYEE RELATIONS COMMISSION | |
| 2 | | RECORECTED RECORDER |
| 3 | In the Matter of | |
| 4 | LOS ANGELES COUNTY PROFESSIONAL PEACE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, |) Section 1 |
| 5 | Charging Party, |) UFC 9.6 |
| 6 | and |)) |
| 7 | COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES |) |
| 8 | (SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND PETER J. PITCHESS, SHERIFF), |)) |
| 9 | te de la constant de | |
| 10 | Respondent. |)) |
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| 12 | APPEARANCES: For Respondent: | John H. Larson, Esq. County Counsel |
| 13 | | The second secon |
| 14 | | John M. Baskett, Esq. Deputy County Counsel |
| 15 | For the Union: | Bodle, Fogel, Julber, |
| 16 | By: | Reinhardt and Rothschild Lester G. Ostrov, Esq. |
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| 18 | HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT | |
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| | 0 D 1 00 1074 T A | |

On December 30, 1974 Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association, herein referred to as the Union, duly filed with Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission, herein referred to as the Commission, a charge alleging, among other things, that the County of Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and Peter J. Pitchess, Sheriff, herein referred to either as Respondent or as the Sheriff's Department, that the Respondent, in violation of Section 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(3) of the Employee Relations Ordinance of the County of Los Angeles, herein referred to as the Ordinance, on or about July 30, 1974, unilaterally changed the then existing work hours and the then existing practice of lunch breaks of Respondent's Transportation Bureau employees without prior consultation or negotiation with the Union, the certified representative of said employees.

On March 11, 1975 the Commission duly served upon Res-

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On March 20, 1975 Respondent duly filed with the Commission a motion for a Bill of Particulars and a request for an extension of time in which to file an Answer to said Charge, which motion and request were referred by the Commission to me for consideration and disposition.

Pursuant to my Order, dated March 25, 1975, granting in part Respondent's motion for a Bill of Particulars and extending Respondent's time to file an Answer to and including April 14, 1975, the Union, on April 4. 1975 served a Bill of Particulars on Respondent's counsel and on the same day duly filed a copy thereof with the Commission, together with proof of service of a copy thereof.

On April 14, 1975 Respondent duly filed with the Commission an Answer, together with proof of service of a copy thereof upon the Union's counsel, denying the commission of the unfair labor practices alleged.

Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held on April 23, 1975 at Los Angeles, California, before the undersigned, the duly designated Hearing Officer. Each party was represented at the hearing by counsel. Full and complete opportunity was granted the parties to call, examine and crossexamine witnesses and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. At the conclusion of the taking of the evidence the parties were afforded an opportunity to argue orally on the record, to file briefs or to do both. Oral argument was waived. The parties were given until June 20, 1975 to file briefs. Each party filed a brief on June 20, 1975, which briefs have been carefully read and considered by me.

Upon the entire record in the case and from observation of the witnesses, I make the following findings, and recommendations.

PREFATORY STATEMENT

Being of the opinion that the employees of Los Angeles County should be granted the right to organize and to select their own labor organization or representative to represent them for the purposes of participating in decisions affecting their wages, hours and working conditions, the Board of 32 Supervisors of Los Angeles County discussed the matter at one of its formal

sessions which was held in or about 1967, with the County Director of the Department of Personnel, the County Counsel, representatives of labor organizations representing various groups of County employees, representatives of local business associations and with individuals interested in the matter. At the conclusion of said discussion the Board of Supervisors requested the County Director to prepare and submit for its consideration a proposed Employee Relations Ordinance.

A series of draft proposals were submitted from time to time by the County Director to the Board of Supervisors. Each submitted draft, however, brought forth strong objection to portions thereof or to the entire draft by one or more of the participating groups or individuals.

On January 30, 1968 the County Director submitted to the Board of Supervisors what is referred to as his final draft proposed ordinance. When strong objection was raised to its acceptance, the Board of Supervisors appointed a Consultants' Committee, composed of Benjamin Aaron as Chairman, Lloyd H. Bailer and Howard Block, three renowned experts in the field of employer-employee relations, each of whom was not in any way connected with the County of Los Angeles, except possibly by being a resident thereof, or with any group, individual or labor or business organization which had previously participated in this matter of County employee representation. Since this Consultants' Committee from its inception has been publicly referred to as the Aaron Committee it will be so referred to herein.

After carefully considering both the County Director's series of draft proposals and all the objections advanced to those drafts by the various organizations representing the County employees, County management and other groups and individuals, the Aaron Committee held public hearings, had private discussions regarding the matter of a proposed Employee Relations Ordinance with representatives of County management, with representatives of labor organizations representing various groups of County employees, and with principal interested persons.

Upon completion of the hearings and consultations referred to immediately above and after considering and evaluating the numerous oral

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and written suggestions and recommendations of the above mentioned groups and individuals, ranging from a completed draft of a proposed Ordinance to the argument that no ordinance regulating employment relations for County employees was necessary or desirable at the moment, the Aaron Committee submitted to the Board of Supervisors, on July 25, 1968, a proposed Employee Relations Ordinance together with a lengthy Report and Recommendations. The latter document consisted mainly of a detailed discussion of the major provisions of the ordinance coupled with the Committee's reasons why each of said major provisions must be embodied in any ordinance adopted since they insure to the County employees, County management and the general public their respective legitimate rights. Specifically, the Report and Recommendations called the Board of Supervisors' attention to the fact that the proposed ordinance insures the managers of the various County agencies the right, in order that they might promptly and without interruption, carry out the functions entrusted to them, to initially determine the manner in which those functions are to be performed and that the affected employees likewise had the right to challenge those decisions by means of filing grievances or charges with respect to the practical consequences those decisions may have on their wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.

Upon receipt of the proposed ordinance and the Committee's Report and Recommendations, the Board of Supervisors advised all interested parties that it would hold a formal hearing on the matter on September 3, 1968.

On August 30, 1968 the Chairman of the Aaron Committee wrote the Board of Supervisors, advising it that the Committee had met with representatives of County Department of Personnel, the County Counsel, the Chief Administrative Officer, and the County Federation of Labor; that as a result of the discussions at those meetings, the Committee had prepared 24 revisions to its July 25, 1968 proposal, which he understood were acceptable to and supported by the County Department of Personnel, the Chief Administrative Officer and the County Federation of Labor; that he was attaching to the letter a list of the 24 suggested revisions with explanatory comments; that the comments marked with an asterisk were drafted by the Committee and the

others were drafted by the office of the County Counsel; that the County Counsel has approved as to form the proposed ordinance as revised; that the proposed revisions are almost entirely technical in nature and are intended to eliminate ambiguities and to clarify meanings; that the only substantive change of any consequence concerns impasses over the scope of negotiable subjects; that all parties attending the above mentioned meetings agreed to eliminate from the July 25, 1968 proposal the specific clause relative to that subject and to handle all impasse matters in the manner prescribed in Section 13 of the Committee's original proposed ordinance; that he was making available copies of the letter and the list of 24 proposed revisions to all organizations representing County employees and to other interested parties; and that the Committee and the parties who participated in preparing the proposed revisions urge the immediate adoption of the July 25, 1968 proposed Employee Relations Ordinance as revised.

At the formal session of the Board of Supervisors held on September 3, 1968, after adequate opportunity was afforded all interested parties to be heard, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

" RESOLUTION Regarding

ADOPTION OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ORDINANCE

The Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles does resolve as follows:

That the document entitled "An Employee Relations Ordinance for Los Angeles County--Report and Recommendations of the Consultants' Committee" filed with this Board on July 25, 1968 by Benjamin Aaron, Lloyd H. Bailer, and Howard Block, the three employee relations Consultants previously retained by this Board to prepare and submit a proposed Employee Relations Ordinance for the County of Los Angeles and accompanying Report, as well as the subsequent Report filed by said Consultants on August 30, 1968 with this Board recommending amendments to the proposed Employee Relations Ordinance, are hereby found to be accurate statements of this Board's intent and purpose in adopting Ordinance No. 9646 entitled "The Employee Relations Ordinance of the County of Los Angeles" and each provision thereof, except to the extent that any provisions of the proposed Ordinance as recommended by said Consultants may have been subsequently amended by this Board in adopting said Employee Relations Ordinance. "

The Ordinance became effective, by order of the Board of Supervisors, on October 4, 1968.

II. THE PERTINENT FACTS

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Most of the testimony adduced at the hearing centered $\frac{1}{4}$ directive issued by Victor D. Riesau, Chief of Technical Services Division of the Sheriff's Department, to all Unit Commanders of that Division, including Captain Kenneth R. Hays, the Unit Commander of the Transportation Bureau, and the latter's order of August 6, 1974 implementing Riesau's aforementioned directive. The directive and subsequent order of Hays were unilaterally issued without prior notice to or consultation with the Union.

The portion of Riesau's directive which the employees here involved and their certified representative found especially objectionable reads as follows:

"All personnel assigned to a regular letter schedule shift of five days on and two days off shall have a time span of eight and one-half (8-1/2) hours between start and end of their shift. The one-half (1/2) hour in excess of eight is for the purpose of a meal period."

In short, the aforesaid directive increased the work hours of all "five on and two off" Sheriff's Department employees from eight to eight and one-half hours.

Captain Hays' August 6 order only affected the work hours of the <u>day shift</u> Field Sergeants, Headquarters Sergeant (also called Watch Sergeants), Watch Deputies, Desk Deputies, and Utility Correction Officers.

Under date of December 23, Lieutenant Stuart W. Avery, who at that time was Acting Captain of the Transportation Bureau, caused to be posted on the Bureau's bulletin board the time each group of day shift

^{1/} Unless otherwise noted all dates hereinafter mentioned refer to 1974.

 $[\]frac{2}{}$ Copies of each of said documents were posted on the Transportation Bureau bulletin board shortly after its issuance.

^{3/}There are three separate employee units here involved; Deputy Sheriffs, for whom the Union was certified as their majority representative on July 13, 1974; Supervisory Peace Officers, consisting of lieutenants and sergeants, for whom the Union was certified as their majority representative on January 9, 1970; Utility Correction Officers for whom the Union was certified as their majority representative on March 30, 1973.

From September 23, 1969 until March 30, 1973 the Utility Correction

From September 23, 1969 until March 30, 1973 the Utility Correction Officers were represented by another labor organization. Prior to the above mentioned certifications the deputy sheriffs and the supervisory peace officers were not represented by any majority representative.

The hours of the above named officers working the evening shift or the early morning shift were not affected by Hays' order, although their basic pay was the same as the day shift officers.

employees was to take its lunch break. This notice, like Riesau's July 30 directive and Hays' August 6 order, was unilaterally issued and put into effect without prior consultation with the Union.

Prior to 1969 or 1970 all Transportation Bureau employees worked an eight and one-half hour shift, with no specific time set aside for lunch breaks. During either of said years, Captain Baker, the Bureau's then Unit Commander, unilaterally issued an order reducing the work hours to eight hours, again without specifying when the employees were to take their lunch breaks.

The record discloses that the duties of the Field Sergeants, Headquarters or Watch Sergeants, Watch Deputies and Utility Correction Officers are such that they are unable to eat their lunch at any specific hour each day. It would unduly protract this Report to set forth the various duties each of these officers is called upon to perform during a normal shift, but the uncontraverted evidence clearly indicates that they have to eat their lunch whenever and wherever the opportunity to do so arises. These officers did not seem to complain about when and where they ate their lunch. In fact, even though their work hours were increased 30 minutes, the uncertainty as to when and where they had their lunch still existed. Avery's assignment of certain lunch hours did not, in reality, remedy the situation for the aforementioned officers still eat their lunch on a "catch-as-catch-can" basis.

Between August 6 and August 28, day shift Field Sergeant Rodney Graham, as the Union's representative of the unit composed of the Transportation Bureau's lieutenants and sergeants, complained to Hays on three separate occasions that the latter's August 6 order "infringed" upon the employees' rights and that he felt it was unfair to make the affected day shift officers report for duty at 5:30 in the morning instead of six o'clock under the guise that they would have a regular specified 30 minutes for lunch, and he requested Hays to meet with the Union to discuss and negotiate the matter. On each of these occasions Hays informed Graham that he was powerless to do anything about the matter because of Riesau's July 30 directive.

On or about August 29 Graham presented to his immediate

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superior, Lieutenant Stuart W. Avery, a document, dated August 28 and signed by eleven day shift Transportation Bureau officers, reading in part as follows:

"The undersigned aggrieved personnel do hereby protest the unfair and discriminatory action by the Chief, Technical Service Division, and the Commander of the Transportation Bureau in arbitrarily, without notification or the agreement of the aggrieved parties, changing the work shift from eight (8) to eight and one-half (8-1/2) hours contrary to long established practice. The aggrieved parties feel the above to be an unfair labor practice.

The aggrieved parties that have worked during the extra half (1/2) hour [believe they should] be compensated as per Salary Ordinance and that the Division Order dated 7/30/74 and the Transportation Bureau order dated 8/6/74 be rescinded."

Under date of October 11, Assistant Sheriff William J. Anthony, for and on behalf of Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess, wrote the Union as follows:

"Pursuant to the grievance dated August 28, 1974, initiated by four Sergeants, six Deputies, and one Corrections Officer, I have thoroughly considered the pertinent information relative to the change of working hours in the Transportation Bureau.

The revision from an eight hour day to an eight and one-half hour day involves positions within the Transportation Bureau that have been identified as those which will be entitled to a half hour lunch break during the working day. Any work beyond the regularly scheduled working hours will be subject to review for applicability of overtime credit.

I, therefore, concur with the decision of the Review Board that the current scheduling practices remain in effect and that any claim for overtime credit will be considered on an individual basis."

Other than Anthony's letter, quoted immediately above, and the conversations Graham had with Avery and with Hays, as epitomized above, Respondent never conferred or communicated with any Union representative regarding the change in hours which went into effect on August 6.

III. CONCLUDING FINDINGS

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly and uniformly held that an employer was under a duty to bargain with the majority representative of his employees in an appropriate unit about his <u>decision</u> to change the wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment of his employees. That duty to bargain, the Court stated, included the obligation to notify the majority representative <u>prior</u> to making the change and to give such representative a chance to negotiate with respect to the contemplated change.

In its post-hearing brief the Union's counsel cites some of those Supreme Court cases and relies heavily upon them in support of the Union's position that Respondent has violated the Ordinance by engaging in the unfair labor practices alleged in the Charge as amplified by its Bill of Particulars.

Since all the cases heretofore decided by the Supreme Court involving notification to the employees' majority representative before the contemplated change of the employees' conditions of employment were put into effect involved employers in the private sector category they are not directly applicable to the instant proceeding since (1) we have before us a public sector proceeding; (2) Section 6(a) of the Ordinance provides: "All matters affecting employee relations, including those that are not subject to negotiation, are subject to consultation between management representatives and the duly authorized representatives of affected employee organizations. Every reasonable effort shall be made to have such consultation prior to effecting basic changes in any rule or procedure affecting employee relations"; and Section 6(b) reads: "The scope of negotiation between management representatives and the representatives of certified employee organizations includes wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment within the employee representation unit"; and (3) in the Aaron's Committee July 25, 1974 Report and Recommendation 4/the Committee, in explaining why a broad management rights clause was desired, stated that in its opinion "Managers of governmental agencies must insure that the functions entrusted to them are carried out promptly and without interruption. We think they should have the right initially to determine the manner in which these functions are to be performed. Accordingly, the provision we recommend explicitly sets forth those rights that County management may exercise unilaterally and without prior negotiation with employees or their organizations." 5/

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By its resolution of September 3, 1968 the Board of Supervisors adopted in toto the Aaron Committee's proposed ordinance, as revised, and the Committee's Report and Recommendation and the Committee's August 30, 1968 letter. The undersigned has considered, therefore, the latter two documents in the nature of the legislative history of the Ordinance as enacted on September 3, 1968 and thus ample use has been made of them in considering this matter.

Granted, that Respondent was not obliged to notify, discuss, or negotiate with the Union its decision to increase the hours of the day shift Transportation Bureau employees prior to putting that decision into effect, Respondent, however, was under a mandatory duty, pursuant to Section 6(a) and (b) and Section 12(3) of the Ordinance to accede to the Union's requests to discuss and negotiate Hays' order after the increased hours had been put into effect. Hays' and Avery's disclaimer of authority to meet with the Union's representatives and discuss the matter in an attempt to resolve it, plus Assistant Sheriff Anthony's October 11 letter, quoted in full above, singularly and collectively, evidence Respondent's absolute refusal to abide by the mandatory provisions of the Ordinance to meet and discuss matters regarding the working conditions of the employees involved.

The duty to discuss and negotiate a change in employees' wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment which an employer already put into effect does not impose an unfair or undue burden upon the employer. The obligation to discuss or negotiate about a condition of employment already put into effect in no wise obligates an employer to reverse his decision or to yield to the employees' representative's demand that the change be rescinded.

Experience has shown that candid discussion of mutual problems by labor and management frequently results in their mutual resolutions with attendant benefit to both sides. Such discussions with a duly designated employee representative is all the Ordinance contemplates. But it commands no less.

In addition to a general averment that it did not in any manner violate any provision of the Ordinance as alleged, Respondent raised three separate and distinct defenses which are: (1) That the Memorandum of Understanding which each of the appropriate employee units entered into with the Sheriff's Department and which documents were approved by the Board of

In the paragraph immediately following the one above quoted reads, in part: "Nothing in the section on employer rights shall preclude employees from raising grievances about the practical consequences that decisions on matters reserved for management may have on wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."

Supervisors contain identical clauses which precludes the Union from now contesting the validity or reasonableness of Hays' August 6 order; (2) That Section 80 of Ordinance No. 4099, adopted by the Board of Supervisors on October 7, 1955, which grants to each County department head the authority to designate and fix the working hours of departmental personnel under his command, supersedes and controls over any past practice which is in conflict or inconsistent with it under the terms of the above-mentioned memoranda between the Union and the Sheriff's Department; and (3) that the past practice of the heads of various County agencies has been to designate and fix the working hours of personnel under their command and that such action was followed in the Transportation Department when Hays' August 6 order was put into effect.

As to (1) above, Article 20 of the Deputies or Peace Officers Memorandum of Understanding, Article 19 of the Supervisor Peace Officers Memorandum of Understanding, and Article 24 of the Utility Correction Officers Memorandum of Understanding are identical and provide as follows:

- "A. This Memorandum of Understanding sets forth the full and entire understanding of the parties regarding the matters set forth herein. Any other prior or existing understanding or agreements by the parties, whether formal or informal, regarding any such matters are hereby superseded or terminated in their entirety.
- "B. Except as specifically provided herein, it is agreed and understood that each party hereto voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives its right, and agrees that the other shall not be required to negotiate with respect to any matter covered herein or with respect to any other matters within the scope of negotiations, during the term of this Memorandum of Understanding.
- "C. No agreement, alteration, understanding, variation, waiver or modification of any of the terms or provisions contained herein shall in any manner be binding upon the parties hereto unless made and executed in writing by the parties hereto and, if required, approved and implemented by County's Board of Supervisors.
- "D. The waiver of any breach, term or condition of this Memorandum of Understanding by either party shall not constitute a precedent in the future enforcement of all its terms and provisions."

The Union at no time requested the Sheriff's Department to negotiate or renegotiate any term or condition of the existing Memorandum of Understanding which it had entered into with the Sheriff's Department prior to August 6. All the Union desired was an opportunity to discuss with the

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Sheriff's Department the August 6 increase in the hours each of the day shift Transportation Bureau employees were ordered to work, with the sole object in mind of having this order rescinded. Accordingly, it is concluded that Respondent's reliance on the above mentioned memoranda of understanding is without substances or merit.

As to (2), after the proposed Employee Relations Ordinance was submitted to the Board of Supervisors on July 25, 1968, the members of the Aaron Committee met with, among others, the County Counsel, County Department of Personnel, and the Chief Administrative Officer and discussed suggested revision of the proposed ordinance. As the result of these discussions 24 revisions were made to the July 25, 1968 proposed ordinance; these revisions were acceptable to and supported by the County Department of Personnel, the Chief Administrative Officer, and by others.

When the July 25, 1968 proposed ordinance and the 24 revisions were presented to the Board of Supervisors on September 3, 1968, the Ordinance, as revised, was unanimously adopted by that body.

The pertinent portions of Section 6 of the Ordinance as finally adopted read:

- "(a) All matters affecting employee relations, including those that are not subject to negotiation, are subject to consultation between management representatives and the duly authorized representative of affected employee organizations. Every reasonable effort shall be made to have such consultation prior to affecting basic changes in any rule or procedure affecting employee relations.
- (b) The scope of negotiation between management representatives and the representatives of certified employee organizations includes wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment within the employer representation unit." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 12 of the Ordinance as finally adopted deals with unfair employee relations practices and the pertinent portions thereof read:

"It shall be an unfair employee relations practice for the County. . . to refuse to negotiate with representatives of certified employee organizations on negotiable matters".

The Sheriff's Department contention that since Section 80 of Ordinance 4099, which was adopted approximately 13 years before the Employee Relations Ordinance became effective, gave each department head of the various County agencies the unlimited authority to "designate the

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working hours within his department and [he] shall determine the actual time [his] employees shall report to their work stations --- " and hence Respondent was free to ignore the Union's demands to discuss the August 24 increase in hours of the day shift Transportation Bureau employees is without merit. To find otherwise would make the County employees' rights and those of its duly certified representative under the Ordinance a nullity.

As to (3), the record discloses that on only one occasion the hours of any County employee were changed and that change was made in 1969 or 1970 when Captain Baker, the then Unit Commander of the Transportation Bureau, reduced the hours of all the employees under his command. The Sheriff's Department points to the fact that no protest to Baker's decision was made, and that it thus follows that Baker's action set a precedent for any and all future unilateral action any department head may take respecting the working conditions of the employees under his command. It might be said, without fear of successful contradiction, that no normal government employee would file a protest when informed that his work day was shortened and his basic pay remained unaffected by the change. Moreover, at the time of Baker's order reducing the Transportation Bureau's hours from 8-1/2 to 8, the only person here involved having a certified representative was the Utility Correction Officer. Why that labor organization which is not the one here involved did not protest is quite obvious. Under the circumstances, it is concluded that this contention is likewise without merit.

RECOMMENDED REMEDY IV.

Section 12 of the Ordinance substantially charts proscribed activities of both employers and labor organizations which constitute unfair labor practices.

The Aaron Committee Report and Recommendations made no specific recommendation with respect to the Commission's remedial powers nor did the Board of Supervisors attempt to enumerate in the Ordinance any fixed remedies for each substantive violation committed. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that, in adopting the Ordinance, the Board of Supervisors did not engage in the empty gesture of creating rights without parallel remedies.

It is axiomatic that remedial action, if it is to afford an effective redress for the commission of a statutory wrong, must be tailored to restore to the wronged the condition he would have occupied but for the action of the wrongdoer. Where an employer refuses to discuss or negotiate with the duly certified representative of the employees whose working conditions have been affected by the unilateral action of their employer, as here, said employer must be required to restore the status quo ante by abrogating his action of changing the hours of the affected employees and fulfill his obligation to meet, consult and negotiate when so requested by the Union. Of course, in the instant proceeding when that obligation has been satisfied, Respondent may lawfully change the hours of any of its employees represented by the Union without prior consultation or negotiation with the Union.

Having found that Respondent violated Section 12(3) of the Employee Relations Ordinance by refusing the Union requests to meet with it to discuss and negotiate the effect Captain Hays' August 6 order had on the Transportation Bureau day shift employees here involved, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing said employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 12(1) thereof, it is recommended that the Commission order Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and from in any other like or similar manner interfering with its employees' rights under the Ordinance and to take the following affirmative action:

- (1) Within 10 days after receipt by it of a Union request to meet, Respondent be ordered to meet, discuss, and in good faith negotiate with the Union the desirability and reasonableness of Captain Hays' August 6 order and the resulting effect said order has been having, and is having, on the employees here involved;
- (2) Immediately rescind Captain Hays' August 6 order and give no effect to it until Respondent completely complies with the requirement set forth in (1) above;
- (3) Make whole all the employees affected by Captain Hays'
 August 6 order by payment to each of them one-half hour's pay at overtime
 rate for each half-hour worked in excess of eight hours per shift since the

implementation of Captain Hays' August 6 order until said order has been rescinded. At the election of Respondent payment, as prescribed herein, may be made either by cash or by granting said employees compensatory leave.

Hearing Officer

July 17, 1975